An Opportunity Not to be Missed

A Progress Review of the US-UK Atlantic Declaration, One Year on

Francesca Lentini, Policy Manager, BritishAmerican Business
Emanuel Adam, Chief Trade and Policy Officer, BritishAmerican Business
Duncan Edwards, Chief Executive Officer, BritishAmerican Business
In Summary

One year on, our analysis of the progress to deliver the sixteen commitments in the Atlantic Declaration suggests encouraging, if somewhat mixed, results. Half of the commitments have been achieved or made sufficient progress to be graded Green. This list includes great progress in aerospace and defence, as well as additional collaboration in AI, data regulation and in future facing technologies. Most importantly, we were encouraged to see the first ADAPT meeting take place in late May in Washington DC, suggesting governments are making efforts to keep the momentum high on the commitments made in the declaration.

Concerns remain around the remainder of the items in the agreement, where we noted that progress has been minimal or non-existent, such as the absence of significant developments on reaching a Critical Minerals Agreement.

We acknowledge that the commitments in the Atlantic Declaration are ambitious and that the fact alone that there is visible progress should be applauded. We also fully understand that many of the commitments in the Atlantic Declaration touch on complex national security issues and that necessary resource and time continue to be focused on the international conflicts in the Middle East, Ukraine and other flashpoints. However, this paper argues that the rising tensions in the world are exactly why the ideas in the Declaration, such as enhancing co-operation and providing frameworks for collaboration for the most important future facing industries, are so crucial. We hope that, whatever the outcome of elections in both countries, the next administrations will see fulfilling the promise of the Atlantic Declaration as an opportunity too important for both countries to be missed.

Background

The declaration, signed on 8th June 2023 during the UK PM Rishi Sunak’s visit to the US, aims to strengthen US-UK cooperation in several important areas. It sets out an ambitious list of aspirations, a so-called Action Plan for a Twenty-First Century US-UK Economic Partnership (ADAPT), in five focus areas, ranging from leadership in critical and emerging technologies; cooperation on economic security and technology protection toolkits and supply chains; partnering on an inclusive and responsible digital transformation; building the clean energy economy of the future; and further strengthening the alliance across defence, health security, and space.

At the time of the announcement, BAB welcomed the declaration as an opportunity for the US and the UK to set new benchmarks in areas critical to their economies. BAB recognised the potential of this new agreement in having a positive impact in US-UK relations, and to have as big an economic impact as an FTA, if implemented in a timely and committed manner, together with wider efforts in trade and investment promotion, and domestic efforts to strengthen innovation and the growth potential of the US and UK economies.

In December 2023, six months after the signing of the declaration, BAB published a RAG (Red Amber Green) review of the progress on the declaration's commitments. That first RAG review highlighted that, while we could see some progress since the publication of the Atlantic Declaration, many of the commitments made in the declaration had yet to be visibly addressed. This included, for example, the area of emerging technologies, export controls, and the ITAR exemption for defence products, among others.

Overall, out of the sixteen commitments in the Atlantic Declaration, three were assigned a green rating, which means they had been met; twelve were assigned an amber rating, as they had either been partially met, or have a longer-term timeline, which means they could not be fully assessed yet; and finally, one was assigned a red rating, indicating the commitment
had not been met or was not on track to being met.

In the six-month review, BAB also suggested that, if there was limited resource available to deliver all of the commitments, both sides should focus on commitments with the potential for the biggest impact and the greatest chance of success. We also recommended that officials in both countries explore more visible ways to have business and other stakeholders involved in the realisation of the full benefits of the declaration, so business can continue to offer its full support behind the set ambitions.

Finally, BAB was careful to acknowledge that reviewing progress on such a broad range of complex commitments after just six months was tough on both governments. This was especially the case given the ongoing focus on the war in Ukraine and the unexpected catastrophe of events in Israel and Gaza.

**Our Analysis – One Year on**

This paper is the second iteration of the RAG review, a twelve-months progress report on the commitments set out in the Atlantic Declaration. As with the previous progress report, BAB analysed progress made on these commitments since the signing of the declaration, taking into account each commitment’s timeline as defined in the agreement, and using government sources, media reporting, and information gathered through stakeholder outreach, as well as consultation with the BAB Trade Sub-Committee.

Overall, our analysis produced the following results: twelve months after the publication of the Atlantic Declaration, eight commitments can be assigned a green rating; six can be assigned an amber rating; and finally, two have been assigned a red rating. Compared to the first review conducted after six months, the green ratings have increased from three to eight and the red from one to two, whereas the amber ratings decreased from twelve to six.

This can be explained mainly by two factors: first, the declaration set out a one-year timeline for some of the commitments, so it was easier to assess progress this time round compared to only six months in; secondly, one year is a better length of time to establish whether we are on track to achieving some of these commitments, even if they do not have a specific timeline assigned to them. As such, some commitments were assigned a green rating even if not fully met, if there was substantial progress made in the last twelve months (this is the case of export controls, for instance); on the other hand, some commitments were assigned an amber or red rating even if their timeline is more long-term, if very minimal or no progress was made in the last twelve months (as is the case for the pledge of making the 2020s the decisive decade for climate action).

BAB noticed a general trend of fewer actions being taken against commitments with a tighter timeline, such as the Critical Minerals Agreement, or the second meeting of the US-UK Comprehensive Dialogue on Technology and Data; on the other hand, we also noticed a number of smaller steps being taken against commitments with a longer timeline, although better communication and publicity around these achievements could be beneficial.

BAB was pleased to see the ADAPT meeting take place in Washington DC in May 2024, signalling an intention from both governments to keep the momentum high and continue the collaboration set out in the declaration. On the same day, the White House also hosted the inaugural Strategic Technologies Investor Council, another positive development BAB was pleased to acknowledge. We look forward to learning more about the members, governance and agenda for the STIC, how frequently it is to meet and whether its deliberations will be made public.

On the other hand, the government-to-government meeting of the Comprehensive Dialogue on Tech & Data, which could have been used to make further progress on the commitments in the Atlantic Declaration, has not taken place yet, despite being initially scheduled for Q1 2024; and we are yet to see any further developments on negotiations for a Critical Minerals Agreement. These appear to be the biggest identifiable misses for an agreement which has otherwise made some notable progress in select areas.
Furthermore, of the five items that BAB identified in the previous progress review as being of greatest value and likely to have fewer challenges in getting delivered, just two, Item 14 around defence co-operation, and Item 3 on creating a Strategic Technologies Investor Council, have made enough progress to be graded Green. Item 1, a shared workplan for critical and emerging tech, and Item 12, a Joint Action Group on Energy Security and Affordability, have made little visible progress. Item 13, a plan to work together on Civil Nuclear Power, looks more promising and has been graded Amber.

A full analysis of all the commitments can be found below. As the relationship between the US and the UK continues to evolve, BAB encourages both governments to continue implementing the commitments set out in the Atlantic Declaration to fully realise the potential of this agreement, especially those commitments with the potential for the biggest impact and the greatest chance of success. With elections coming up in both countries, it is important not to miss this opportunity and we urgently encourage the two governments, and their successors, whoever they might be, to continue working together to achieve what was set out in this important declaration signed a year ago.
“Ensuring US-UK Leadership in Critical and Emerging Technologies”

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<td>1. Through different forums, including the US-UK Agreement on Scientific and Technological Cooperation and the US-UK Comprehensive Dialogue on Technology and Data, the US and the UK will develop and deliver a shared workplan on critical and emerging technologies, to be updated and taken forward.</td>
<td>In the context of Critical and Emerging Technologies. The two countries also commit to reducing their vulnerabilities across critical technology supply chains.</td>
<td>By June 2024</td>
<td>No progress yet, although not due until June 2024. No shared workplan has been released to the public yet. On 29 August, the US extended its science and technology agreement with China by six months. The US-UK Data Bridge has been finalised (see relevant section). This was a goal set at the inaugural meeting of the U.S.-UK Comprehensive Dialogue on Technology and Data. In July 2023, the UK was granted Associate status in the Global Cross Border Privacy Rules (CBPR) Forum. 2023’s objectives of the US-UK Comprehensive Dialogue on Technology and Data can be found here.</td>
<td></td>
<td>The second meeting of the US-UK Comprehensive Dialogue on Technology and Data was initially targeted to take place in Q1 2024, but has not yet taken place. The most recent updates from the US-UK Comprehensive Dialogue on Technology and Data date back to the inaugural meeting of this forum, and refer to commitments to be achieved in 2023. Progress on these commitments has not been reviewed, as the Dialogue has not met since.</td>
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2. Launching collaboration across priority technologies, such as: quantum technologies, cutting-edge telecoms, synthetic biology, semiconductors, and AI.

This collaboration includes R&D and talent flows.

On quantum technologies: a few days prior to the publication of the Atlantic Declaration, a new collaboration on quantum information science between the US and the UK was announced.

On cutting-edge telecoms: in early October 2023, the UK joined a global coalition for telecoms innovation with several countries, including the US. The main areas of this collaboration seem to be Open RAN, 6G, and China related security concerns.

In April 2024, the US and the UK AI safety Institutes signed a Memorandum of Understanding to work together to develop tests for advanced AI models.

In January 2024, a UK consortium of universities signed an agreement with a US lab to build a new quantum experiment.

On 14 March 2024, the UK’s Council for Science and Technology and the US’ President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology issued a joint statement.

Domestically, in the UK, DSIT announced new funding to help drive the UK’s efforts to bring forward the next wave of future telecoms technology. The UK also joined the European Union’s “Chips Joint Undertaking” in March 2024. In Feb 2024, the UK Science and Technology Framework was announced.

On 21 May 2024, delegations from the United States and the United Kingdom met in London for the inaugural Joint Committee Meeting (JCM)
3. Commitment to set up a US-UK Strategic Technologies Investor Council

To mobilise private capital towards strategic technologies. The Council will bring leading investors from both sides of the Atlantic together with national security experts to identify funding gaps and unlock new private investment. By June 2024 Not set up yet, although not due until June 2024. The inaugural meeting of the Council took place on 21 May 2024 in Washington DC, convening investors from both sides of the Atlantic to discuss strategies to mobilise private capital, close funding gaps and unlock new investments towards critical and emerging technologies.

“Advancing Ever Closer Cooperation on Technology Protection, Economic Security Toolkits and Supply Chains”

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<td>4. Addressing the national security risks posed by certain types of outbound investment in sensitive technologies. The declaration states</td>
<td>The US and the UK have a shared objective in preventing their companies’ capital and expertise from fuelling technological advances that will enhance the military and intelligence capabilities of</td>
<td>Generic/ no timeline</td>
<td>Progress on the US side: in August 2023, US President Joe Biden signed an Executive Order on Addressing United States Investments In Certain National Security Technologies And Products In</td>
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In particular, the US will work on developing a targeted set of controls on outbound investments in sensitive technologies with a core national security nexus; the UK will engage with business to develop an evidence base to assess and inform how the UK can best calibrate its actions to respond effectively to these risks.

Countries Of Concern.

The UK is assessing the risk in the UK context.

The UK has been engaging with business to develop an evidence base to assess and inform how the UK can best calibrate its actions to respond effectively to these risks. In Sept 2023, the US government had surveyed British businesses on their links to China.

In April 2024, the UK Deputy Prime Minister delivered a speech on economic security, outlining a focus on existing mechanisms (NSI) to intervene in certain outbound investment transactions, and the creation of a dedicated analytical team to assess the risk in sensitive sectors.

The consultation has not been published yet, although not due until the end of 2023.

The UK Strategic Export Control List was updated again in April 2024. This included the UK imposing semiconductor controls, which bring the UK into alignment with the US export controls regime on technology for AI-enabling semiconductors.

Changes are ongoing within the AUKUS framework, to ensure the UK complies with the US export controls regime.
| 6. Strengthening the partnership on sanctions | The US and the UK commit to continuing coordinating their work to tackle sanctions evasion, and “intend to jointly target those facilitating Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine in Russia, Belarus, and in third countries.” |

|  | In July 2023, the inaugural [UK-US Strategic Sanctions Dialogue](#) took place, hosted by the US Department of State in Washington DC. This Dialogue "delivered on the 2023 Atlantic Declaration commitment to strengthen our cooperation on sanctions strategy, design, targeting, implementation, mitigations, and enforcement, bringing together UK and US departments and agencies to discuss priorities across geographic and thematic sanctions regimes". |

|  | For one of the latest updates, see [here](#). |

|  | In Mar 2024, the UK Export Control Joint Unit [announced](#) some export control amendments. |

|  | In his Chatham House speech in April, the UK Deputy Prime Minister [announced](#) a forthcoming consultation on export controls – this is now on hold until after the elections. |

|  | An overview of this collaboration can be found [here](#). |

“Partnering on an Inclusive and Responsible Digital Transformation”

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<td>7. Establishment of a US-UK Data Bridge, which was committed to in principle by both countries.</td>
<td>The data bridge completes the triangulation of transatlantic transfers between the EU, UK, and US. US companies that already participate in the EU-US DPF will now be able to partake in the UK-US data bridge. The two countries also commit to coordinate to further “promote trust in the digital economy, including through support for the Global Cross-Border Privacy Rules (CBPR) Forum and the OECD’s Declaration on Government Access to Personal Data Held by Private Sector Entities”.</td>
<td>Generic/no timeline</td>
<td>The <a href="#">UK-US Data Bridge</a> was agreed, and has been active since 12th October. It will be in effect as a UK extension to the EU-US Data Privacy Framework (DPF).</td>
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<td>8. The UK will be hosting the first global summit on AI Safety this autumn, with the US having committed to attend at a high level</td>
<td>The aim is to bring together key countries, as well as leading technology companies and researchers, to drive targeted, rapid international action focused on safety and security at the frontier of this technology, including exploring safety measures to evaluate and monitor risks from AI.</td>
<td>By the end of 2023</td>
<td>The AI Safety Summit took place on the 1st and 2nd November at Bletchley Park, Buckinghamshire. The goal of the Summit will be to begin a global conversation on how to best manage the risks from recent advances in frontier AI. More information about the Summit can be found <a href="#">here</a>.</td>
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<td>In April 2024, the US and the UK AI safety Institutes signed a <a href="#">Memorandum of Understanding</a> to work together to develop tests for advanced AI models.</td>
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<td>9. Launch of a Collaboration on Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs)</td>
<td>To allow the two countries to gain more valuable insight from data and train responsible AI models, enabling economic and societal benefits, while protecting individuals’ privacy and democratic principles.</td>
<td>Generic/no timeline</td>
<td>Progress is yet to be seen on this specific collaboration. However, the US and the UK already have a history of collaboration in this area. For instance, in 2022, the two countries <a href="#">launched</a> Innovation Prize Challenges in Privacy-Enhancing Technologies to Tackle Financial Crime and Public Health Emergencies.</td>
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<td>No further progress has been seen here.</td>
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### “Building the Clean Energy Economy of the Future”

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<td>10. Commitment to making the 2020s the decisive decade for climate action, implementing the respective 2030 nationally determined contributions under the Paris Agreement, and meeting the 2050 net zero emission goals</td>
<td>Generic/no timeline</td>
<td>With UK PM Rishi Sunak’s recent Net Zero policy delays, these commitments could be at risk. In October 2023, the UK’s Climate Change Committee released an annual progress report on the UK’s ability to meet its decarbonization targets from 2030 onwards, which overall criticises Sunak’s recent policy changes.</td>
<td>The UK’s 2024 Spring Budget had no mention of “climate change”. However, the UK has overachieved its legally binding carbon emissions target between 2018-2022, and has decided not to carry over the 15% surplus to the next carbon budget period. The US has seen more positive developments. The Center for American Progress reported that the Biden administration has taken more climate action than any other in history. The World Resources Institute is tracking Biden administration’s progress against climate action, and so far has rated its action fairly positively.</td>
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**Details**

- **Six Months’ Progress**: With UK PM Rishi Sunak’s recent Net Zero policy delays, these commitments could be at risk. In October 2023, the UK’s Climate Change Committee released an annual progress report on the UK’s ability to meet its decarbonization targets from 2030 onwards, which overall criticises Sunak’s recent policy changes.

**Rating**

- **One Year Progress**: The UK’s 2024 Spring Budget had no mention of “climate change”. However, the UK has overachieved its legally binding carbon emissions target between 2018-2022, and has decided not to carry over the 15% surplus to the next carbon budget period.

- **The US has seen more positive developments. The Center for American Progress reported that the Biden administration has taken more climate action than any other in history. The World Resources Institute is tracking Biden administration’s progress against climate action, and so far has rated its action fairly positively.**
### 11. Launching negotiations on a Critical Minerals Agreement with a congressional consultation

In August 2022, the US introduced the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA). This included the **Clean Vehicle Credit**, a subsidy for the purchase of qualifying battery or fuel cell operated vehicles in the form of a tax credit. To qualify for the full subsidy, a vehicle needs to be equipped with a battery with at least some of its critical mineral content from the US or a country the US has an FTA with.

Without a US-UK Critical Minerals Agreement, the UK risks being excluded from US automotive supply chains.

### Immediately

Unclear at what point of the negotiations we are, but we have heard that good progress has been made. **POLITICO** labels the negotiations "ongoing". On 28 October, US Trade Representative Katherine Tai said “significant progress” was made on a U.S.-UK critical minerals agreement.

The US already has a Critical Minerals Agreement with **Japan**, which was signed on 28 March 2023. On 28 October 2023, the UK signed a **Memorandum of Cooperation** with Japan on critical minerals.

US-EU deal on track to be reached **this year**.

In October 2023, the UK **hosted** the Principals’ meeting of the Minerals Security Partnership for the first time, focused on boosting responsible investment and sustainable finance in critical mineral supply chains. The meeting was co-chaired by US Under Secretary for Economic Growth, Energy and the Environment Jose Fernandez.

### No updates have been made public around these negotiations.

During the ADAPT meeting on 21 May 2024, officials discussed "how to advance efforts to build resilient clean energy supply chains key to our energy transition, [...] by advancing negotiations towards a Critical Minerals Agreement."
12. Launching a one-year Joint Clean Energy Supply Chain Action Plan, to identify actions to accelerate the buildout of capacity in both countries to meet the clean energy demands of the future.

Under the one-year plan, the U.S. and UK will establish a Joint Action Group on Energy Security and Affordability (JAG) to, by the end of 2023, identify and determine near-term actions to accelerate the buildout of capacity sufficient to meet future clean energy demands in their respective countries and globally. The U.S. and UK will conduct public-private consultations across clean energy supply chains, including with producers of offshore wind power and electric vehicle batteries, and conduct rapid stress-test exercises, which could form a model for future work on supply chain resilience.

By the end of 2023

While the JAG has theoretically been set up, no clear outputs from this group have been identified or published so far.

In terms of public-private consultations, the UK published the following calls for evidence:

- Enabling industrial electrification
- UK Battery Strategy

No updates have been made public on the progress of the Joint Action Group on Energy Security and Affordability (JAG). During the ADAPT meeting that took place on 21 May 2024 in DC, officials welcomed the progress on their engagement with industry on clean energy supply chains. However, a shared workplan remains to be seen.

The first mention of the JAG dates back to the 3rd meeting of the UK-US Strategic Energy Dialogue, held in Feb 2023 (before the Atlantic Declaration was signed). According to this joint statement, the JAG was set up in 2022. The 4th meeting of the Dialogue was held in April 2024, but no mention of the JAG or its action plan can be found in the joint statement.

JAG meetings are not made public, but we know they
The UK and the US have also engaged with industry on clean energy supply chains.

13. Launching a Civil Nuclear Partnership and a Joint Standing Committee on Nuclear Energy Cooperation (JSCNEC), designed to deliver on shared commitments.

“Our joint activity and leadership will support and facilitate the safe, secure, and sustainable international deployment of advanced, peaceful nuclear technologies, including small modular reactors, in accordance with the highest non-proliferation standards and consistent with a 1.5 degree Celsius limit on global warming”

By the end of 2023

While the JSCNEC has theoretically been set up, no clear outputs from this group have been identified or published so far.

During the fourth meeting of the US-UK Strategic Energy Dialogue, DOE and DESNZ acknowledged the launch of the Civil Nuclear Partnership and the establishment of the US-UK Joint Standing Committee on Nuclear Energy Cooperation, which is expected to first meet later this year (2024) in the United Kingdom.

On this commitment, we have seen some progress: in January, the UK became the first European country to launch the HALEU programme, backed by £300m investment, with HMG then awarding £196m to Urenco in May to build a HALEU enrichment facility; in the US, in May, President Biden signed into law a Russian uranium ban.
“Strengthening our Alliance Across Defence, Health Security, and Space”

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<td>14. Optimising the US-UK longstanding defence cooperation.</td>
<td>Specifically, the US “President plans to ask the United States Congress to add the United Kingdom as a “domestic source” within the meaning of Title III of the Defense Production Act”. “Together the U.S. and the UK are taking steps to streamline defence trade between our nations, including the U.S. proposal to Congress to modernise export control laws to enhance collaboration between and among AUKUS nations. The UK is also examining its export control regime to streamline the flow of defence trade among the AUKUS partners”.</td>
<td>Generic/ no time-line</td>
<td>The UK (and Australia) are still waiting for Congress to pass the ITAR exemption. As a reminder, back in April 2023, Pentagon had submitted a legislative proposal to Congress that would amend the law to add both UK and Australia to Title III.</td>
<td>BAB</td>
<td>The 2024 US National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) allowed exemptions to the US International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) for the UK and Australia. In April, changes to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) eased most licensing restrictions on exports/reexports to and within Australia and the UK of items subject to the EAR. As further progress, as of 1 May 2024, the AUKUS nations have agreed to reform their export controls to support licence free trade between and amongst the nations. The US will reform its export controls on defence equipment and technology (ITAR) – publishing a draft exemption for the UK and Australia from the ITAR regulations.</td>
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<td>15. Enhancing the two countries’ collaboration on biological and health security.</td>
<td>The two countries commit to collaborate further on biological security to bolster future health and economic resilience. They will also enhance cooperation on tackling emerging infectious disease threats, including preventing market failures in the space of R&amp;D of vaccines, therapeutics, and diagnostics.</td>
<td>Generic/no timeline</td>
<td>On 12 June 2023, the UK published a new Biological Security Strategy to strengthen the UK’s defences against infectious diseases, biological attacks and antibiotic resistance. The press release mentions the Atlantic Declaration and the UK’s commitment to strengthen their “bilateral collaboration with the United States on biological health and security, including through closer cooperation to tackle drug-resistant infections.”</td>
<td>On 16 Jan 2024, the US and the UK announced a Strategic Dialogue on Biological Security, reflecting on a shared ambition to bolster future health and economic resilience against a growing and diverse spectrum of biological threats.</td>
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| 16. Strengthening space collaboration | The US and the UK are committed to enhancing their bilateral commercial space cooperation, taking tangible steps within space sustainability and their respective regulations. | Generic/no timeline | A good step forward: in August 2023, the UK announced the recipients of the first phase of its £20 million International Bilateral Fund investments, which will help the UK to form “collaborations that will progress space research and catalyse investment in new technologies”. US’ organisations were included as recipients of this funding, among other countries. The AFA’s Air, Space & Cyber Conference, held in early September 2023, highlighted. | On 26 June 2023, it was announced that the UK Space Command would be connected to the U.S. Space Command’s commercial space-tracking cell (Joint Task Force-Space Defense Commercial Operations Cell (JCO)). On 5 Sept 2023, the UK Space Agency announced a US/UK partnership in electric space propulsion between Britain’s Pulsar Fusion and the University of Michigan. On 25 Oct 2023, the UK Space
how “the creation of the U.S. Space Force in 2019 helped spark a wave of new military space organizations around the globe and opened the door to more collaboration and discussion with allies”, but that more still needs to be done if the US and the UK want to achieve true space collaboration.

According to Air Marshall Harvey Smyth, UK Air and Space Commander, “the US and its closest allies are still struggling to find space programs where they can work together to develop new technologies and capabilities”.

Agency signed an agreement for a UK astronaut mission with Axiom Space, a Houston-based company.

In Feb 2024, a new alliance between business schools in the UK, USA and Australia was announced. Its aim is to use the power of education to strengthen international cooperation on defence and space.

In April 2024, the UK Space Agency awarded Rolls-Royce and BWX Technologies funding to develop nuclear microreactor technology for space missions. The contract further strengthens UK and US collaboration on a first-of-a-kind space technology innovation set forth under the Atlantic Declaration commitment.

For queries and comments, contact:
Francesca Lentini
Policy Manager
BritishAmerican Business
flentini@babinc.org